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1 |  INTRODUCTION
Most people wear helmets during cycling, driving a motor 
bike, or skiing because they are convinced that such gear 
reduces the risk of head injuries (Ross, Ross, Rahman, & 
Cataldo, 2010). For example, a few years ago, a well‐known 
German politician and a world‐famous Formula 1 racer suf-
fered head injuries caused by skiing accidents. Although 
both wore a helmet and survived, a person involved in the ski 
accident with the politician did not wear a helmet and died 
immediately. Afterward, the helmet industry in Germany 
experienced a steep increase in helmet sales (Tödtmann, 
2009). These perceived benefits notwithstanding, some re-
search has highlighted an adverse effect of helmet wearing 
in that people tend to take more risks when wearing a hel-
met than when not wearing one (for a review, see Adams & 
Hillman, 2001; Trimpop, 1994; Trimpop & Wilde, 1993). 
This adverse effect, termed risk compensation (Peltzman, 
1975), has been addressed by several related theoreti-
cal frameworks including the most popular (Pless, 2016; 
Trimpop, 1994, 1996) but highly controversial (Evans, 1986; 
Pless, 2016; Radun, Radun, Esmaeilikia, & Lajunen, 2018) 
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Abstract
A recent study claims that participants wearing a bike helmet behave riskier in a 
computer‐based risk task compared to control participants without a bike helmet. 
We hypothesized that wearing a bike helmet reduces cognitive control over risky be-
havior. To test our hypothesis, we recorded participants' EEG brain responses while 
they played a risk game developed in our laboratory. Previously, we found that, in 
this risk game, anxious participants showed greater levels of cognitive control as 
revealed by greater frontal midline theta power, which was associated with less risky 
decisions. Here, we predicted that cognitive control would be reduced in the helmet 
group, indicated by reduced frontal midline theta power, and that this group would 
prefer riskier options in the risk game. In line with our hypothesis, we found that par-
ticipants in the helmet group showed significantly lower frontal midline theta power 
than participants in the control group, indicating less cognitive control. We did not 
replicate the finding of generally riskier behavior in the helmet group. Instead, we 
found that participants chose the riskier option in about half of trials, no matter how 
risky the other option was. Our results suggest that wearing a bike helmet reduces 
cognitive control, as revealed by reduced frontal midline theta power, leading to risk 
indifference when evaluating potential behaviors.
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theory, called risk homeostasis (Wilde, 1988, 1998), and an 
alternative framework called risk allostasis (Lewis‐Evans & 
Rothengatter, 2009). Similar concerns about risk compensa-
tion have been discussed for other safety‐related tools such as 
seat belts (Adams, 1982), airbags, safety goggles, or vaccina-
tions (for reviews, see Pless, 2016; Trimpop, 1994; Trimpop 
& Wilde, 1994).
A recent study (Gamble & Walker, 2016) postulated that 
risk compensation might also be effective in risk situations 
where people wear protective devices that have no direct, 
obvious protective function for the risky action they are en-
gaged in. The authors showed that participants wearing a bike 
helmet while playing the balloon analogue risk task (BART), 
a computerized risk game (Lejuez et al., 2002), took greater 
risks than participants in a control group wearing a baseball 
cap. To keep participants of both groups blind about the pur-
pose of the study, they were falsely told that the headgear 
would be used to record their eye movements during the 
game. Participants of both groups were asked to stepwise in-
flate a virtual balloon on a computer screen by pressing a 
button as long as they believed the balloon would not burst. 
Pumping the balloon could be stopped at any time, and the 
money earned would be banked for later payout. However, in 
case of a burst, the collected winnings of the trial were lost. 
Thus, the level of risk taking was characterized by the num-
ber of button presses that inflated the balloon. Even though 
the helmet had no direct protective function for the computer 
game, participants wearing the helmet showed greater risk 
taking and more pumping actions than participants wearing 
the baseball cap. Furthermore, the helmet wearers also re-
ported higher scores of sensation seeking than the cap wear-
ers. This relatively enhanced risk preparedness and sensation 
seeking in the helmet wearers was interpreted by Gamble and 
Walker (2016) as effects of social priming. On this account, 
they reflect implicit unconscious propensities to generalize 
protective effects of safety devices beyond their common area 
of application.
These findings of Gamble and Walker (2016) run counter 
to commonly held beliefs about the effects of helmet wearing 
and as such have drawn considerable public attention while 
being received controversially by the scientific community 
(e.g., Radun & Lajunen, 2018). We therefore attempted to 
extend and replicate their observations. Another point is that 
the Gamble and Walker study did not experimentally assess 
participants' concepts about implicit unconscious beliefs and 
social priming. Since such concepts are difficult to disentan-
gle experimentally, we instead tested whether the concept of 
cognitive control and its neuronal foundations could provide 
insight into the behavior of the helmet wearers.
To be specific, we hypothesized that wearing a bike helmet 
might ameliorate participants' implicit concerns about risk 
when engaged in risky decision making, which would be re-
flected in reduced cognitive control during task performance. 
Cognitive control describes the ability to use internal goals 
to guide thought and behavior (Egner, 2017). This includes 
the process of monitoring ongoing actions and performance 
outcomes (Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 
2004), which is necessary for adaptive goal‐directed behavior 
(Koechlin, Ody, & Kouneiher, 2003). In the context of risky 
behavior, cognitive control comes into play when participants 
have to decide between riskier and less risky alternatives, 
where high risk is characterized by an unknown probabil-
ity distribution of the option outcome (De Groot & Thurik, 
2018). We hypothesized that wearing a bike helmet would in-
duce a sense of security in participants, which in turn would 
diminish cognitive control over risky behavior even in task 
domains that are entirely unrelated to traffic such as com-
puter‐based risk games.
Cognitive control is subserved by a network of brain 
structures including the prefrontal cortex, the orbitofrontal 
cortex, and the anterior cingulate cortex, as revealed by le-
sion studies (Gläscher et al., 2012), functional neuroimaging, 
and animal neurophysiology studies (Egner, 2017). Notably, 
the control function of anterior cingulate cortex appears to be 
reflected in frontal midline theta EEG oscillations (Cavanagh 
& Frank, 2014; Holroyd & Umemoto, 2016). For example, 
frontal midline theta power is enhanced after participants 
committed a cognitive or behavioral error, when participants 
received negative feedback about the output of a targeted 
action, or when there is a high amount of conflict between 
potential cognitive and/or behavioral alternatives (Cavanagh, 
Zambrano‐Vazquez, & Allen, 2012). Frontal midline theta 
power is also associated with effort and attentional processes 
associated with anterior cingulate cortex function (Holroyd 
& Umemoto, 2016).
In the context of risky decision making, less risky be-
havior might be mirrored in reduced frontal midline theta 
power (Schmidt, Kanis, Holroyd, Miltner, & Hewig, 2018). 
In a recent study, we showed by use of mediation analysis 
that anxiety was associated with greater frontal midline theta 
power during the decision time, which in turn predicted less 
risky choices afterward (Schmidt et al., 2018). We argued 
that participants showing greater frontal midline theta power 
when making risky decisions exerted more cognitive control, 
which in turn led to more conservative behavior. Due to these 
findings, we hypothesize that wearing a bike helmet reduces 
cognitive control, which would be reflected in lower frontal 
midline theta power. Wearing a bike helmet might induce the 
feeling of security accompanied by reduced cognitive con-
trol. Riskier behavior should in turn be associated with lower 
cognitive control and reduced midfrontal theta power (Aron, 
2007; Schmidt et al., 2018).
To test this hypothesis, we aimed to replicate the study by 
Gamble and Walker (2016) while recording the EEG from 
participants playing a risk game. Since the BART (Lejuez 
et al., 2002) used by Gamble and Walker has problematic 
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features for its use in EEG experiments (see Discussion), we 
used an alternate risk game developed in our lab where ex-
pected values of each response option are equal on each trial 
(Schmidt et al., 2017, 2018, 2019; Schmidt & Hewig, 2015; 
Schmidt, Mussel & Hewig, 2013). In each trial of this game, 
participants decide between playing a very risky gamble of 
winning either 11 or 0 cents with a probability of 50%, or 
playing a less risky gamble like winning either 5 or 6 cents 
with a probability of 50%. The expected values are thus equal 
for both alternative gambling options, and participants know 
the probability distribution governing the outcomes. This 
task design is characteristic of a risk game as opposed to an 
uncertainty game (De Groot & Thurik, 2018).
Taken together, the aim of our present study was to rep-
licate the Gamble and Walker study and extend its observa-
tions by additionally investigating the neuronal mechanism 
associated with risk behavior when participants wear a bike 
helmet during the computer‐based risk task. We predicted 
that wearing a bike helmet would reduce cognitive control 
about the task performance and that this would be revealed 
by decreased frontal midline theta power. Apart from the in-
clusion of EEG brain responses and the change of the behav-
ioral task, we followed the methods described in the study by 
Gamble and Walker (2016).
2 |  METHOD
2.1 | Participants
We tested 40 participants separated into two groups of 20 
participants. We recruited participants via Facebook posts 
in groups including people who are willing to participate 
in experiments, which were not only university students. 
We also sent an email invitation via the distribution list 
of the psychology department of the University of Jena. 
Participants of the helmet group wore a bike helmet dur-
ing the experiment, whereas participants of the control 
group did not. The study was single‐blinded, as the partici-
pants did not know that there were two groups in our ex-
periment that differed concerning their headwear. In each 
group were 10 male and 10 female participants. The aver-
age age of participants in the helmet group was 22.4 years 
(SD = 3.2, range 18‒29 years) and that of the control group 
was 23.3  years (SD  =  2.9, range 19‒30  years). Payment 
depended on the outcomes in the risk game. On average, 
participants won 13.16 Euros (SD = 0.26) during the game. 
In addition, participants received 6 Euros per hour for par-
ticipation or course credit. The whole experimental session 
lasted about 90 min. The ethics committee of the Faculty 
of Social and Behavioral Sciences of the Friedrich Schiller 
University of Jena approved the study, and the study is in 
line with the Declaration of Helsinki. To implement the 
ethical requirement to debrief participants after the experi-
ment while also guarding against participants telling any-
one else about it, after debriefing we asked them not to tell 
others about the real purpose of the helmet.
2.2 | Procedure
Prior to the experiment, participants read written instructions 
and signed an informed consent. Afterward, they filled in the 
State‐Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) to assess trait and state 
components of anxiety (Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 
1970; German version by Laux, Glanzmann, Schaffner, & 
Spielberger, 1981). Trait anxiety implies a behavioral pro-
pensity to assess environmental conditions more likely as 
threatening. State anxiety is characterized by subjective feel-
ings of apprehension and tension (Spielberger, 1966). State 
and trait components of anxiety are assessed by 20 questions 
each. These items are scored from 1 (not at all) to 4 (very 
much). Therefore, scores of both scales vary between 20 and 
80. Then, an electrode cap (Easycap, Wörthsee‐Etterschlag) 
for recording the EEG was mounted on participants' heads. 
Participants sat in a dimly lit room on a comfortable chair 
in front of a computer monitor that was positioned approxi-
mately 100 cm apart from the participants. Participants in the 
helmet group wore a plastic shower cap and a bike helmet in 
addition to the electrode cap (Figure 1). The shower cap was 
required to keep the electrode gel from the bike helmet. The 
helmet was big enough that it did not put much pressure on 
the electrodes, which prevented artifact contamination of the 
EEG.
At the front of the bike helmet an eye tracker (SMI, Teltow) 
was fixed as in the study of Gamble and Walker (2016). This 
eye tracker served as a cover story for the participants. In the 
following, we describe our efforts to make the cover story as 
F I G U R E  1  Participant with electrode 
cap (left, control group) and participant with 
electrode cap, shower cap, and bike helmet 
(right, helmet group)
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believable as possible in order to prevent participants from 
becoming suspicious about the real purpose of the helmet. 
They were told that the bike helmet holds a camera that tracks 
their eye movements (see Figure 1). In the control group, par-
ticipants were told that their eye movements are tracked by 
an eye tracker installed on a table in front of them. However, 
no eye‐tracking data were recorded in this study. To make 
the cover story even more valid, we carefully adjusted the 
eye tracker on the helmet and simulated the calibration proce-
dure of the eye tracker in both groups. During the calibration 
procedure, participants gazed at a dot that moved at different 
locations of the screen in front of them.
After calibration of the eye tracker, participants filled in 
the Sensation‐Seeking Scale Form V (SSS‐V, Zuckerman, 
Eysenck, & Eysenck, 1978). This scale measures four dimen-
sions (10 self‐report items each) of sensation‐seeking behav-
ior: thrill and adventure seeking, disinhibition, experience 
seeking, and boredom susceptibility. Scores on the SSS‐V 
range from 0 to 40, with higher scores indicating more sen-
sation seeking. After that, participants played the risk game 
as described below to assess their risk behavior. After the 
risk game, participants filled in the STAI‐State questionnaire 
again. Then, the helmet and the electrode cap were removed, 
and participants were offered a shower to wash their hair. 
When they returned, they filled in the STAI‐State question-
naire a third time. At the end of the experiment, they filled 
in a final questionnaire. One question asked how secure they 
felt during the experiment using a Likert scale ranging from 
1 (very insecure) to 10 (very secure). Bicycling frequency 
was also assessed using a Likert scale ranging from 1 (never) 
to 6 (five times a week or more) as described in Gamble and 
Walker (2016). If participants selected anything other than 
never on this instrument, helmet‐wearing frequency was 
assessed using a Likert scale ranging from 1 (never) to 6 
(always) as described in Gamble and Walker. Finally, par-
ticipants indicated whether they believed that the helmet af-
fected their behavior during the experiment and if so, how. 
Afterward, participants were debriefed about the cover story.
The risk game was presented using Presentation soft-
ware (Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc., Berkeley, CA; www.
neuro bs.com). Statistical analyses were performed with R (R 
Development Core Team, 2019). For between‐group t tests, 
we used the Welch unequal variances t test implemented in R 
that corrects the degrees of freedom in case of unequal vari-
ances. We used Cohen's d to quantify effect sizes for t tests. 
Sizes of ANOVA effects were estimated by omega‐squared.
2.3 | Risk game
Participants played the same risk game as described in ear-
lier studies of our group (Schmidt et al., 2013, 2017, 2018; 
Schmidt & Hewig, 2015). Participants played two blocks of 
the risk game, each consisting of 120 trials. The two blocks 
were separated by short breaks in which participants rated 
the response options according to their perceived valence, 
arousal, and riskiness. Valence and arousal were measured 
using the Self‐Assessment Manikin (Bradley & Lang, 1994). 
The rating scales ranged from 1 to 9 with higher scores indi-
cating more positive, more arousing, and riskier evaluations. 
One block of the risk game lasted about 20 min.
At the beginning of each trial, a fixation cross was shown 
for a random interval of 1,000 to 2,000 ms (Figure 2). Then, 
two options were presented that differed in their associ-
ated risks. Both of these options consisted of two monetary 
rewards. The expected value of both options was always 
5.5 cents, and the degree of riskiness differed between the 
F I G U R E  2  Time course of one trial in 
the risk game
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options, from 11 cents versus 0 cents as the riskiest option 
and 6 cents versus 5 cents as the safest option. Participants 
always chose between the riskiest option (11 cents vs. 0 
cents) and one of the other options. All option pairs were 
presented in random order and at random locations on the 
monitor screen. Participants were required to choose an op-
tion by pressing one of two buttons. After another random 
interval of 500 to 1,000  ms, two cards were shown face 
down (Figure 2). Then, participants had to choose one of 
the cards by pressing one of two buttons with their right 
hand. After another random interval of 500 to 1,000 ms, the 
back of the selected card was shown, displaying either a di-
amond that indicated the higher monetary reward (positive 
feedback) or a square indicating the lower monetary reward 
(negative feedback), together with the statement “You get 
XX cents!” for 1,500 ms. Unbeknownst to the participants, 
on 50% of the trials the monetary feedback was positive 
and on the other 50% the monetary feedback was negative, 
delivered at random independently of their choices. All 
stimuli in the risk game occupied about 10° of visual angle 
horizontally and 5° vertically. At the end of the game, the 
total accumulated reward was presented to the participants. 
Participants were paid the corresponding amount.
2.4 | EEG recording and ERP 
quantification
The EEG was recorded using BrainAmp amplifiers (Brain 
Products GmbH, Gilching, Germany) from 64 Ag/AgCl elec-
trodes mounted on participants' heads including one elec-
trode under the left eye. All electrodes were referenced to the 
electrode FCz. Impedances of all electrodes were kept below 
10 kΩ. Data were band‐pass filtered online from 0.016 Hz 
to 250 Hz. For offline data processing, EEGLAB (Delorme 
& Makeig, 2004) running under the MATLAB environment 
(The MathWorks, Inc.) was used.
For offline analysis, EEG sampling rate was reduced to 
250 Hz. For eye artifact correction, independent component 
analysis (ICA) was applied as proposed by Debener, Thorne, 
Schneider, and Viola (2010). Eye‐related artifact components 
were removed by back‐projection of all remaining compo-
nents. The artifact‐corrected data were then rereferenced to 
the mean of electrodes TP9 and TP10. For ERP analysis, the 
data were filtered with a low‐pass filter of 20 Hz. For frontal 
midline theta analysis, EEG data were segmented into ep-
ochs around the presentation of risk options −2,500  ms to 
2,500 ms. Residual artifacts were identified by statistical cri-
teria (joint probability and kurtosis) and removed from all 
further analysis.
To quantify frontal midline theta power, we performed a 
wavelet analysis as described in HajiHosseini and Holroyd 
(2013) and Schmidt et al. (2018). We used complex Morlet 
wavelets to compute power values for frequencies between 
1 and 20 Hz for every trial and averaged the trials for each 
participant. The time‐frequency resolution was 1 Hz. Then, 
we computed a baseline between −500 ms to −200 ms before 
the presentation of options and performed a baseline correc-
tion for every participant. Finally, we extracted power values 
for the theta range (4‒8 Hz) within a time window between 
100 ms and 360 ms at electrode FCz to get frontal midline 
theta power values for every participant and condition. It is 
the same time window as in our previous study (Schmidt et 
al., 2018) and is in line with observations reported in reviews 
of frontal midline theta by Cavanagh and Shackman (2015). 
For plotting, we averaged power values over participants after 
baseline correction and performed a logarithm transforma-
tion to plot data as dB change from baseline.
3 |  RESULTS
3.1 | Anxiety scores, sensation seeking, and 
frequency of bicycling
Trait anxiety scores measured via the STAI trait did not dif-
fer between groups (p > .3, Mhelmet = 38.7, Mcontrol = 36.3). 
The minimum score in both STAI parts is 20, and the 
maximum score is 80, with higher scores indicating more 
anxiety. Also, sensation‐seeking scores measured with the 
SSS‐V did not differ between groups (p > .7, Mhelmet = 22.5, 
Mcontrol = 22.1). Recall that, as stated in the Method, scores 
on the SSS‐V range from 0 to 40 with higher scores indi-
cating more sensation seeking. The two groups also did not 
differ concerning any of the four subscales of the SSS‐V. 
According to the questionnaire that was delivered at the end 
of the experiment, participants in the two groups did not 
differ concerning their experienced security during the ex-
periment (p  >  .4, Mhelmet  =  8.7, Mcontrol  =  9.0). This scale 
ranges from 1 to 10, with high scores indicating more se-
curity. Also, both groups reported equivalent frequencies of 
bicycling (p >  .6, Mhelmet = 4.1, Mcontrol = 3.8). This scale 
ranges from 1 (never) to 6 (more than five times a week). The 
participants in the helmet group indicated that they wore a 
bike helmet more often than did the participants in the control 
group, t(16.7) = 2.4, p = .03, Mhelmet = 1.9, Mcontrol = 1.1. On 
this scale, 1 indicates never and 6 indicates always. During 
the debriefing, one person in the helmet group spontaneously 
reported that the helmet affected her behavior because it re-
stricted her movements. This participant explicitly said that 
the feeling of being restricted only referred to head move-
ments, and that she had no idea concerning the real purpose 
of the helmet. We therefore did not exclude the data of this 
participant from further analysis.
To test the effects of the helmet on participants' state anx-
iety, we applied an analysis of variance (ANOVA) on STAI 
state scores with the between‐subjects factor group (hel-
met, control) and the within‐factor time (before putting on 
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electrode cap and helmet, after the risk game, after removing 
electrode cap and helmet). The only significant effect in this 
analysis was the main effect of time, F(2, 76) = 7.7, p < .001, 
ω2 = .04. State anxiety ratings decreased during the experi-
ment from the time before participants put on the electrode 
cap and helmet (M = 35.7) to the time after the risk game 
(M = 34.3) to the time after removing the electrode cap and 
helmet (M = 32.6). The main effect of group was not signif-
icant (p > .2).
3.2 | Risk behavior
Participants chose one of the presented risk options after 
on average 1.4  s (SD  =  0.4  s). In order to visualize the 
participants' risk behavior, we computed the percentage of 
risky decisions for every participant by dividing the num-
ber of trials in the risk game where the participant chose 
the riskier option by the number of all trials (see Figure 3). 
We performed separate regressions of risk behavior on the 
alternative option for the helmet and the control group. The 
slope of the helmet group regression line was 0.0, centering 
around the 50% line, whereas the slope of the control group 
regression line was 10.3. To test if the difference between 
the two slopes was significant, we performed a model test. 
We compared a regression model that included only main 
effects of group (helmet, control) and option (6:5 cents, 
7:4 cents, 8:3 cents, 9:2 cents, 10:1 cents; Model 1) with a 
regression model that included main effects of group and 
option as well as the interaction between group and op-
tion (Model 2). Model 2 including the interaction of group 
and option fitted the data significantly better than Model 1 
without this interaction, G2 = 6.62, p = .01. This indicates 
that in the helmet group participants chose the riskier op-
tion in about half of the trials independent of the alternative 
option (zero regression slope), in contrast to the control 
group, where participants' choices clearly depended on the 
alternative option (nonzero regression slope). Post hoc t 
tests revealed that participants wearing a bike helmet chose 
the riskier option more often (M = 49%) than did partici-
pants in the control group (M = 26%) when the difference 
in these options was most extreme, that is, when they chose 
between the riskiest option (11 or 0 cents) and the safest 
option (6 or 5 cents), t(36) = 2.6, p = .01 (Figure 3).
3.3 | Option ratings
We performed separate ANOVAs on the valence, arousal, 
and riskiness ratings of the risk options, with group as a be-
tween‐subjects factor (helmet, control) and risk option as a 
within‐subject factor (6:5 cents, 7:4 cents, 8:3 cents, 9:2 cents, 
10:1 cents, 11:0 cents), revealing main effects of risk option 
for all ratings (valence, F(5, 190) = 2.6, p = .03, ω2 = .03; 
arousal, F(5, 190)  =  54.7, p  <  .001, ω2  =  .31; riskiness, 
F(5, 190) = 176.0, p < .001, ω2 = .65). Visual inspection of 
the data indicates lower valence, higher arousal, and higher 
perceived riskiness with increasing riskiness of the options 
(Figure 4). The only significant difference between the hel-
met and the control group emerged for valence ratings of the 
safest option. Participants in the control group rated the safest 
option (6:5 cents) as more positive than participants in the 
helmet group, t(38) = 2.2, p = .03.
3.4 | Frontal midline theta analysis
We analyzed frontal midline theta power measured at elec-
trode FCz (Figure 5). A mixed two‐factor ANOVA on frontal 
midline theta power, with group as the between‐subjects factor 
(helmet, control) and risk option as within‐subject factor (6:5 
cents, 7:4 cents, 8:3 cents, 9:2 cents, 10:1 cents, 11:0 cents) 
revealed a significant main effect of group, F(1, 38) = 4.3, 
p = .04, ω2 = .08, d = .7. Frontal midline theta power was 
lower in the helmet group (M = 1.26 μV2, SD = 0.2 μV2) 
compared to the control group (M = 1.41 μV2, SD = 0.3 μV2; 
Figure 5). All other effects did not reach significance.
To test if frontal midline theta power is associated with the 
percentage of risky choices in the risk game, we computed 
their correlation based on the values of both variables for all 
40 participants. The correlation was not significant (p = .96).
4 |  DISCUSSION
In the present study, we investigated a neuronal mechanism 
accounting for the surprising and controversial effect of risk-
ier behavior in participants wearing a bike helmet, as reported 
by Gamble and Walker (2016). We predicted that frontal 
midline theta power, a neural indicator of cognitive control 
(Cavanagh & Shackman, 2015; Holroyd & Umemoto, 2016; 
F I G U R E  3  Risk behavior in the helmet group and in the control 
group, dependent on the alternative option that was presented other 
than the risky option 11 cents or 0 cents. Error bars are standard errors 
of the mean. The lines are based on regressions of risk behavior on the 
alternative options, separately for both groups
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Schmidt et al., 2018), would be reduced when participants 
wear a bike helmet and that lower cognitive control would 
be associated with riskier behavior. In line with this asso-
ciation, we found decreased levels of frontal midline theta 
power when participants wore a bike helmet while making 
their decisions, an indicator of reduced cognitive control and 
decreased activation of the anterior cingulate cortex (Holroyd 
& Umemoto, 2016).
In contrast to the results reported by Gamble and Walker 
(2016), participants of the helmet group did not generally 
prefer the riskier option. Frontal midline theta power and 
percentage of risky choices were not significantly associated 
in our study, which might be due to this lacking main effect 
of the helmet on risk decisions (Figure 3). Instead, partici-
pants with helmet chose the riskier option in about half of 
trials, no matter what the alternative option was. In previ-
ous studies using our risk paradigm, we consistently found 
that participants’ choices depended on the level of risk of 
the alternative option, as in the control group in Figure 3 
(Schmidt et al., 2013, 2017, 2018, 2019; Schmidt & Hewig, 
2015). Therefore, we interpret the zero regression in the hel-
met group (Figure 3) as a change in risk preferences relative 
to controls. In particular, when they had to decide between 
the safest and the riskiest option, the participants in the hel-
met group chose the riskier option significantly more often 
than did the participants in the control group. In line with this 
F I G U R E  4  Ratings of risk options on the scales valence, arousal, and riskiness showing that participants rated riskier options as less positive, 
more arousing, and riskier. Participants in the control group rated the safest option 6 or 5 cents as more positive than participants in the helmet 
group. Error bars are standard errors of the mean
F I G U R E  5  Participants wearing a 
bike helmet showed lower frontal midline 
theta power at FCz compared to participants 
without helmet during their decision time. 
At time 0, the risk options are presented. 
Black rectangles indicate the analyzed 
window from 100 ms to 360 ms after option 
presentation in the theta range (4–8 Hz)
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observation, participants in the helmet group also rated the 
safest option as significantly less positive compared to the 
control group. This difference in valence ratings between the 
two groups suggests that participants in the helmet group did 
not simply act randomly, choosing the riskier option in about 
half of trials. Instead, they appear to have chosen the riskier 
over the safest option relatively more often because they eval-
uated the latter option less positively.
As ratings of riskiness and arousal did not differ signifi-
cantly between groups, we assume that participants of both 
groups differentiated properly between the six different op-
tions of the risk game. The difference in their behavior thus 
cannot be based on improper conceptualizations of the dif-
ferent risk levels or on the fact that the different risk levels 
evoked similar arousal in the helmet wearers. Instead, we as-
sume that wearing a bike helmet resulted in decreased cogni-
tive control during task performance and reduced sensitivity 
to risk over decisions that are completely unrelated to bicy-
cling and physical safety.
In contrast to the study by Gamble and Walker (2016), we 
did not find differences between groups concerning sensa-
tion‐seeking scores measured by the SSS‐V. This discrepancy 
could be due to several reasons. First, we used a different risk 
paradigm in order to avoid a critical feature of the BART, 
as used by Gamble and Walker. This task requires partici-
pants to gradually inflate a virtual balloon to increase their 
winnings. Every time they incrementally inflate the balloon, 
the probability of a burst increases. If the balloon bursts, the 
winnings on that trial are lost. Thus, on each step of the trial, 
the participant decides between either accepting the risk of 
inflating the balloon further or terminating the trial to receive 
their accumulated winnings, so the dependent variable is the 
number of times participants pressed the button for inflat-
ing the balloon on the trials where the balloon did not burst. 
Crucially, each time participants inflate the balloon, the ex-
pected value—which is the product of the balloon value and 
the probability not to burst—changes. While a fixed amount 
of money is added to the balloon value after each successful 
inflation, the probability to burst increases faster after each 
inflation, such that the optimal expected value is achieved 
at the midway point after 64 inflations (Lejuez et al., 2002). 
Therefore, participants make up to 128 responses on each 
trial, and the total number of presses varies across trials, 
making it difficult to associate neural activity with any one 
response value. By contrast, the task in our study involved 
one choice per trial, allowing us to relate frontal midline theta 
power to that decision. In addition, participants in the BART 
do not know the probability distribution of the outcomes, 
which makes it an uncertainty game instead of a risk game 
(De Groot & Thurik, 2018).
Second, in contrast to the previous study, the participants 
in our experiment wore an electrode cap in addition to the 
bike helmet. Further, participants in the control group did 
not wear a baseball cap with an eye tracker mounted on it, 
as we could not place a baseball cap on top of the electrode 
cap. Instead, we placed the eye tracker on the table in front 
of the participants in the control group. Although we cannot 
rule out the possibility that this modification affected the re-
sults, we think that it is more plausible that the differences 
in the observed results are due to the differences in the tasks 
themselves. Likewise, the participants in the helmet group 
reported wearing a helmet more often than the participants 
in the control group. We do not think that the slightly higher 
frequency of helmet usage in the helmet group can explain 
the results. If it affected the task at all, being accustomed to 
wearing a helmet should lead to a habituation effect (thereby 
reducing the observed effect sizes).
In our study, we address methodological shortcomings of 
the original study summarized by Radun and Lajunen (2018). 
We report how we recruited participants, we made every ef-
fort to make the cover story valid, we asked participants if 
they have been suspicious concerning the real purpose of the 
helmet and made it very clear after the debriefing that it is 
essential not to tell other potential participants about the real 
purpose of the helmet. Participants were all surprised when 
they were debriefed, suggesting that they did not know about 
the real purpose of the helmet before.
We attribute the effect of the bike helmet on risk behavior 
to reduced cognitive control, mirrored by lower frontal mid-
line theta power during the risk decisions. In our previous 
study (Schmidt et al., 2018), frontal midline theta power was 
higher in anxious participants who also showed less risky be-
havior. In our present study, we did not find differences in 
anxiety scores between the experimental groups, in line with 
the results reported in Gamble and Walker (2016). Further, 
participants wearing a helmet did not report feeling safer or 
having been affected by the helmet in any way. Therefore, the 
observed frontal midline theta power effect was not due to 
differences in anxiety in our study. In contrast, based on our 
earlier research, anxiety reflects itself more likely in more 
cognitive control (Schmidt et al., 2018). This is in line with 
the adaptive control hypothesis (Cavanagh & Shackman, 
2015). According to this hypothesis, the brain process in-
volved in cognitive control affects both cognitive and emo-
tional processes. When the alarm calls for cognitive control, 
the feeling becomes more aversive. Note that, in our present 
study, we cannot differentiate if frontal midline theta power 
reflects the alarm signaling that cognitive control is needed 
or the actual application of cognitive control.
The finding that the helmet participants did not generally 
prefer the riskier option is in line with criticism (Pless, 2016; 
Radun et al., 2018) of the risk compensation theory or risk 
homeostasis theory, which postulates that safety features lead 
to riskier behavior (Trimpop, 1996). Rather, our findings 
suggest that the effects of helmets on risky decision making 
may be mediated by their impact on cognitive control levels.
   | 9 of 10SCHMIDT eT al.
Another relevant concept in this regard is priming. 
According to this concept, the bike helmet might act as a con-
ditional stimulus (prime) to activate cognitive and emotional 
processes simultaneously that have been generally associated 
with the purpose of helmets. For example, helmet wearing 
could reduce anxiety about potential injury and other dan-
gers, while also reducing levels of negative affect. Thus, the 
bike helmet could prime feelings of safety that relax cogni-
tive control, which in turn affects risky behavior.
Taken together, we found reduced frontal midline theta 
power in individuals wearing a bike helmet compared to par-
ticipants without a bike helmet when they made decisions 
under risk in a computerized game. As lower frontal midline 
theta power represents a valid indicator of less cognitive con-
trol (Cavanagh & Shackman, 2015), we conclude that wear-
ing a bike helmet is associated with lower cognitive control 
and lower sensitivity to risk differences.
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